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Abstract 
By analysing the case study of a young Muslim man’s conversion within and between 
different expressions of Islam in the Gambia, this article challenges common 
understandings of conversion that see it as a transition from one form of religious 
belief or identity to another, as well as theories of Islam’s place in Africa that 
distinguish between ‘local’ traditions and ‘world’ religions. The ethnographic case 
study illustrates that for Gambian youth conversion is not a unilinear path but entails 
the continuous making of moral negotiations and a preparedness to reflect on the 
ambiguity of selfhood―an inevitable result of the making of these negotiations.  
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When during my ethnographic field research in the Gambia, a West African country with a 
Muslim-majority population, I discussed with a group of young Muslim men the changes in 
their life upon joining Islamic reform movements they told me that they had become ‘true 
Muslims’.1 They defined a true Muslim as a practising Muslim who has integrated the 
Prophet Muhammad’s model in all his undertakings. A Gambian man in his late twenties 
put it as follows:  
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Before, I prayed and fasted, but I didn’t know much about Islam. I called myself a 
Muslim but at that time ‘Muslim’ was a mere title for me. I conceived Islam as my 
right and not as a favour from Allah ... Nowadays even when I’m sleeping I 
observe the Sunna (Prophetic traditions). I worship Allah twenty-four hours a day.  
 
Among the reform movements most popular among Muslim youth in the Gambia are the 
Tablighi Jamaʻat and Salafiyya.2 Whereas the two differ in their method of bringing about 
Islamic reform―with the former mainly concentrating on lay preaching whereas the latter 
puts more emphasis on the importance of religious education―they share what Roy (2004: 
11) calls the ‘quest to define pure religion beyond time and space’. The idea behind Islamic 
reform (tajdid) is that only by observing Islamic principles can the ideal past of the Prophet 
Muhammad be restored. However, the youngsters whom I interviewed were endeavouring 
not only to ‘return to the Prophet’s time’, but also to reconcile their piety with what they 
called a ‘modern’ lifestyle, characterized by listening to popular music, going out with 
their girlfriends to nightclubs and engaging in sports and other forms of leisure. 
Although they had been Muslims by birth, my interlocutors described their joining of 
the Tablighi Jamaʻat and Salafiyya as a ‘conversion’. As in the case of a newborn who is 
converted into a Muslim, several interlocutors shaved their hair or cut off their 
dreadlocks―the outward sign of their previous ‘sinful life’―upon joining these 
movements. Similarly, just as a newborn baby is named to integrate him in society, several 
interlocutors adopted more Arabic forms for their names upon their conversion to the 
Jamaʻat and Salafiyya. This shows that their turn to reformist Islam is not simply a 
commitment to an ideology, but is indeed perceived as a conversion. Interestingly, the 
local term used for the ritual process whereby a newborn is integrated in society, tuubi,3 is 
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the same term that my interlocutors employed to describe their conversion to reformist 
Islam.  
Strikingly, several interlocutors portrayed themselves as ‘Born-Again Muslims’. 
Their ideology of becoming true believers through a process of conversion based on the 
idiom of new birth may bring Pentecostal discourse to mind. Indeed, Islamic reform and 
Pentecostal Christianity share a great deal of common ground in West Africa and, while 
disagreeing on doctrine, overlap in several of the religious practices on which they depend 
and the social processes they set in motion (Larkin and Meyer, 2006). Instead of taking for 
granted the oppositions between the two religious traditions, this article explores their 
convergence as expressed in their conceptions of conversion. Through conversion, both 
reformist Muslims and Pentecostal Christians dissociate themselves, whether symbolically 
or actually, from their past in the form of local cultural traditions. This rupture with the 
past―a precondition for becoming born again―coincides with the development of new 
moral subjectivities. The moral self-transformation set in motion by conversion is of 
central concern in this article.    
The interpretation of conversion in terms of a transformation of the self differs from 
the ‘classical’ definition of conversion, summarized by Lofland and Stark (1965: 862) as 
‘when a person gives up one … perspective or ordered view of the world for another’. In 
this definition, as in Horton’s (1971, 1975a, 1975b) and Fisher’s (1973, 1985) well-known 
conversion theories, the transition from one form of religious belief or identity to another is 
central. This conventional conception stems from the colonial legacy; colonial missionaries 
envisaged conversion to Christianity as a single revelation of a universal Truth. Bringing 
this revelation was considered a civilizing mission and was expected to have a permanently 
transformative effect on the minds of ‘pagans’ (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991).        
While earlier anthropologists focused on conversion between religions and especially 
from local ones to world religions, there is an emergent body of literature on a renewed 
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commitment within Christianity. For instance, Meyer (1998) argues that ‘Make a complete 
break with the past’ is a call to action often heard in Christian circles in Ghana. She points 
out that a break with local traditions coincides with new notions of the self and belonging. 
Whereas for a long time the anthropology of Christianity focused on African Christians’ 
appropriation of traditional religious practices into their vision of Christianity (Meyer, 
2004: 454–458),4 Engelke (2004) illustrates the importance of emphasizing the discourse 
of discontinuity―the break with ‘African custom’―because this allows a better 
understanding of the dynamics of religious change. Although studies on religious rupture 
are not without precedent in the study of Christianity in Africa (e.g. Hastings, 1976), the 
analysis of discontinuity has long been side-lined―a neglect that, according to Robbins 
(2007), has to do with anthropology’s problem of theorizing change. Anthropology has 
largely been a ‘science of continuity’: ‘cultural anthropologists have for the most part 
either argued or implied that the things they study―symbols, meanings, logics, structures, 
power dynamics, etc.―have an enduring quality and are not readily subject to change’ 
(Robbins, 2007: 9). Unless anthropologists reconsider this paradigm of continuity they will 
find it hard to grasp conversion, which inherently implies a radical change (Engelke, 2004: 
85).  
Compared with the massive body of literature on born-again Christianity, conversion 
within Islam seems to be somewhat underrepresented. A possible explanation may be that 
traditional Islamic thought has no concept for conversion. Unlike the Christian baptism, 
there is, strictly speaking, no formal rite of conversion within Islam (Dutton, 1999; 
Woodberry, 1992: 22). In addition, studies of conversion to Islam are, according to Searing 
(2003: 73), relatively rare because there are no written records comparable to those left 
behind by European missionaries. Nevertheless, there is a growing body of literature on 
Islamization based on local perceptions, beginning with Levtzion’s influential work on the 
expansion of Islam in Africa (1979). Since then several Africanists have mapped the 
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political-economic conditions under which Islamization took place and its social 
consequences. Broadly speaking, we see two trends in the literature on Islamization in 
West Africa―the region that is best represented in the literature on Islam in Africa. The 
first trend pays attention to conversion from traditional religion to Islam (e.g. Mark, 1985; 
Searing, 2003; Dramé, 2009; Miran-Guyon, 2012; Thomson, 2012; for reconversion to 
traditional religion see Baum, 1990), whereas the second trend focuses on conversion from 
one branch of Islam to another (e.g. Umar, 1993; Rosander, 1997; LeBlanc, 2000; Augis, 
2009; Leichtman, 2009). While in the first instance elements of the pre-Islamic local 
heritage often survived, in the latter a radical critique of the cultural and religious practices 
of the Muslim elders and a path toward an identity politics of global, pan-Islamic 
affiliation is at stake (Diouf and Leichtman, 2009: 7). What these trends have in common 
is that they interpret Islamization as a continuing process of greater conformity and 
commitment. Generally speaking we could say that whereas scholars studying conversion 
to Christianity tend to represent the process of becoming Christian as one of eventual 
transformation (Robbins, 2010), those studying conversion to Islam usually represent it 
less as an event and more as a perpetual process (Searing, 2003: 73).   
Since the concept of conversion has often been construed in Christian, or, more 
specifically, Paul-on-the-road-to-Damascus terms (cf. Nock, 1933), anthropologists of 
Islam have sometimes preferred an analytical frame other than conversion when writing 
about Islamization, including reform, revival, Islamic education or piety. Striking examples 
of the tendency to analyse Islamic reform in terms of an increasing pietization are 
Mahmood’s (2005), Alidou’s (2005) and Schulz’s (2012) pioneering monographs. 
Although their focus on individual experiences of piety offers important new insights, 
including a shift away from the conception of Islamic reform as a monolithic, political 
force toward the study of Islam as a part of the actual world in which Muslims live, it also 
has certain drawbacks because the focus on pietization over-emphasizes the coherence and 
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disciplinary power of Islam. Much contemporary anthropological scholarship on Islamic 
reform presents a totalizing notion of pious life whereby the earlier lifestyle is exchanged 
for a new, pious one (see also Schielke, 2009a, 2009b). In this regard, the current 
ethnographic work on piety partly reproduces the problems of earlier studies in which 
Islamization was portrayed as a trajectory from an accommodating religion to a pure one 
(cf. Fisher, 1973, 1985).  
Although Islamic reform deserves much wider grounding within the context of 
conversion theories, my focus here is on parallel trends in the anthropology of Islam and 
Christianity. Through the conversion narrative of Abdulaye, a young man who portrayed 
himself as a ‘Born-Again Muslim’, I want to compare Gambian Muslim youths’ 
conversion to reformist Islam with processes of self-transformation within a Pentecostal 
variety of Christianity, thereby shedding new light on religious re-affiliation within Islam. 
Following Engelke (2004), I believe that unpacking a conversion narrative is a good place 
to start in a discussion of moral self-transformation because it allows us to explore ‘the 
urge to become new’ (Meyer, 1998: 321) that drives a great number of young, reformist 
Muslims like Abdulaye.5  
Abdulaye is an eloquent Tukulor―an ethnic minority in the Gambia that became 
strongly Islamized in the late 19th century―in his late twenties.6 Contrary to the somewhat 
idealized way of presenting the turn to reformist Islam in much contemporary 
anthropological scholarship on Islam, Abdulaye’s narrative illustrates that the search for a 
moral lifestyle is accompanied by subjective multivalence. Like many of his peers, the 
question that occupied him most was how to become a ‘good Muslim’. Because the 
Gambia has a long history of Islam and is composed of a Muslim majority population 
adhering to either Sufism, Ahmadiyya,7 Shiʻism or reformist movements like the Tablighi 
Jamaʻat and Salafiyya, or who define themselves simply as ‘ordinary Muslims’ without 
affiliating to any movement officially, there is a wide range of answers possible to this 
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question. In his search for moral perfection, Abdulaye first converted to the Tablighi 
Jama‘at. He later ‘grew bored’ with the Tablighi method of proselytization and decided to 
become a Salafi, striving to return to ‘authentic Islam’. Abdulaye’s shifting allegiances 
illustrate why the study of morality should take into account not only the cultivation of 
piety, but also the struggle, incoherence and imperfection of everyday living (Masquelier, 
2007; Schielke, 2009a, 2009b; Simon, 2009). According to Marsden, ethnographies of 
Muslim societies that focus narrowly on moral self-fashioning are characterized most 
strongly by the quality of ‘coherence’ and ‘are unable to confront the ways in which 
Muslims are called upon to face, explain and contend with inconsistencies and 
complexities in their attempts to live virtuous lives’ (2005: 260–261). Schielke (2009a: 37–
38) therefore pleads for an anthropological study of morality that takes ambivalence as its 
starting point.  
Although the declared aim of the Salafi understanding of Islam is the imposition of 
an all-encompassing moral discipline that follows the example of the Salaf―the pious 
predecessors who lived at the time of the Prophet Muhammad (Meijer, 2009)―in practice 
Abdulaye’s ‘reversion’ to Salafiyya allowed for more contention about what ‘being a good 
Muslim’ involved.8 To solve this contention, he engaged in moral compromising, blending 
the religious with the secular, faith with freedom, the divine with diversion (see also Bayat, 
2010: 36). According to Robbins, compromising is inextricably bound up with the quest 
for morality:  
 
The moral domain is a domain of conscious choice: it is the place where change 
comes to consciousness. For those caught living between two cultural systems, 
morality is likely to provide the window through which they can see the 
contradictions with which they have to live (2004: 14).  
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In the case of Gambian Muslim youth like Abdulaye the ‘two cultural systems’ that 
Robbins sees compromisers as ‘living between’ are represented by a pious world in which 
they strive hard to live in accordance with Islamic principles; and a world of music, dating, 
sports and other youthful pursuits.   
Against the trend to study conversion as a continuous, accumulative movement 
towards a higher level of piety, I analyse Abdulaye’s conversion narrative in terms of a 
succession of waves that affect the lives of Gambian Muslim youth seeking a religious 
dimension in their lives (see also Adraoui, 2009: 379). Studying conversion this way 
explains why Muslim piety, far from being a clear and shared standard by which 
youngsters mark out a transformation toward living a proper Muslim life, is subject to 
fluctuation. As a thirty-year old Gambian Muslim man aptly remarked:  ‘Like the waves in 
the sea, sometimes my iman (faith) goes up and at other times it goes down.’  
The fact that for Gambian Muslim youth like Abdulaye conversion is not a unilinear 
path had implications for the way I conducted fieldwork. It compelled me to follow the 
youths whose conversion narratives I recorded over a long period of time and to focus on 
how they (re)negotiated both their Muslimness and youthfulness in their everyday living. 
Establishing contacts with reformist Muslim youth was quite an undertaking. At first I was 
seen as a spy and an enemy and converts were reluctant to talk with me. To legitimize my 
research, I argued that the image of ‘fundamentalist’ Islam in the West is distorted and that 
my research could help to give a more nuanced picture. This had some effect: a number of 
young men were willing to talk to me, probably induced by curiosity and the idea that it 
was their religious duty to convey their knowledge of Islam to me. I eventually started 
receiving interview appointments and invitations to take part in Muslim activities. 
Nevertheless, my interlocutors’ interaction with me remained marked by a shifting 
interplay between approach and detachment. Although at times frustrating, this attitude 
was easy to understand when taking into account Harding’s observation that among 
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reformists (in her case American Baptists) there is no such a thing as a neutral, participant-
observer position and no place for an ethnographer who seeks ‘information’:   
It was inconceivable to them that anyone with an appetite for the gospel as great 
as mine was simply ‘gathering information’, was just there ‘to write a book’. No, I 
was ‘searching’. . . My story about what I was doing there, instead of protecting 
me from going native (a kind of ethnographer’s verbal fetish), located me in their 
world: I was a lost soul on the brink of salvation (1987: 171).  
 
At the end of my fieldwork I learned that because of my perseverance, I was called the 
‘iron lady’ by my interlocutors. My endurance in conducting field research on reformist 
Muslims who see publicity as threatening and discourage researchers from writing about 
them was somewhat similar to my interlocutors’ perseverance in practising their faith in an 
environment that was often hostile to them. I think that because perseverance is considered 
an Islamic virtue, my interlocutors finally allowed me to record their conversion narratives.  
Before recording Abdulaye’s narrative and analysing his and his peers’ conversion 
experiences within the larger socio-cultural context and political economy of Gambian 
society, I begin with a brief history of the Tablighi Jama‘at and Salafiyya in the country 
and their growth into youth movements. 
 
The reformist expansion  
The Tablighi Jama‘at has its origins in the reformist tradition that emerged in India in the 
mid-19th century. Its founder, Mawlana Ilyas, believed that Muslims had abandoned the 
correct path of Islam. Hence, he stressed that they should go back to their faith, which 
alone would move God to grant them success in this world and the hereafter. To make 
Muslims genuine believers, Ilyas insisted that it was the duty not just of a few learned 
scholars but of all Muslims to carry out tabligh, that is, missionary work aimed at the 
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moral transformation of Muslims. Missionary tours by lay preachers became the hallmark 
of the Jama‘at, established officially in 1927 in the Indian capital of Delhi (Masud, 2000; 
Sikand, 2002).  
Over the years, the Jama‘at has expanded from its international headquarters in India 
and has grown into what is probably the largest Islamic movement of contemporary times 
(Ahmad, 1995: 165). Despite its worldwide influence on the lives of millions of Muslims, 
scholars have paid almost no attention to the movement’s growth in sub-Saharan Africa. 
An explanation for this indifference is that this region is frequently perceived as the 
‘periphery’ of the Muslim world, in terms of both geography and religious influence. 
Moreover, the recurrent idea of a traditional ‘African Islam’ that is Sufi in orientation and 
differs from a more orthodox ‘Arab Islam’ hampers a better understanding of Islamic 
reform.  
Here I focus on the Gambia, which, despite its small size, has become a booming 
centre of Tablighi activities in West Africa during the past decade. The Gambia’s heritage 
from British colonial rule is one factor that has helped facilitate the spread of the Tablighi 
ideology, which was disseminated by South Asian missionaries who preached in English, 
the national language of the Gambia. The appearance of South Asian Tablighi missionaries 
coincided with the recent political Islamic resurgence in the country. Captain Yahya 
Jammeh assumed power in 1994 and invoked Islam to enhance his political legitimacy 
(Darboe, 2007). This provided fresh scope for the creation of a public discourse on Islam 
in the Gambia. As a result, an increasing number of Gambians (and young people in 
particular) seemed to be receptive to a new interpretation of their faith. Thus, conditions in 
the Gambia provided fertile soil for the Jama‘at to take root. 
The genesis of the Jama‘at in the Gambia can be traced to Karammoko Dukureh, a 
trader from Gambisara―a village in eastern Gambia. Dukureh studied in the Arab Muslim 
world and when he returned to Gambisara in the early 1980s, he set out to make the 
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villagers more aware of their religion by denouncing their traditional ways of worship and 
popular forms of piety. Aside from a few sympathizers, the villagers feared that Dukureh 
wanted to introduce a ‘new religion’ and did not agree with his reformist ideas. Dukureh’s 
sermons became increasingly antagonistic toward the traditions of the village elders and he 
was eventually exiled. Until his death in 2000, he continued spreading his ideology in the 
Gambian city of Serrekunda, in the mosque that came to be known as the Markaz (centre), 
where he was appointed imam.  
Since the 1990s, the Markaz has expanded into the pivot of the Jama‘at in the 
Gambia. A mainly youthful audience of up to a thousand is drawn to the weekly 
programme in the mosque. In addition to the Markaz, the Jama‘at also ran a madrasa 
(Islamic school), advocating a puritanical theology based on a literalist interpretation of the 
Islamic scriptures. In the mid-1990s the madrasa was transferred from the Markaz to 
another neighbourhood in Serrekunda, where it can be found today. This transfer had to do 
with lack of space as well as with a difference in perception between the madrasa teachers 
and the Tablighi preachers. Whereas the former claimed that before one sets out on a 
missionary tour one needs profound religious training, the latter argued that even lay 
preachers should perform missionary work. The transfer of the madrasa in 1995 can be 
considered the beginning of the Salafi movement in the Gambia. 
From the 1970s on, local Gambian scholars who had graduated from universities and 
colleges in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya and Sudan introduced Salafi ideas in the 
Gambia. On the grounds that they were educated in formal institutions in the Arab Muslim 
world, these graduates often claimed to have more insight into the proper interpretation of 
Islam than the scholars who were trained in the local tradition. Owing to the renewed Afro-
Arab cooperation that followed Jammeh’s assumption of power in the Gambia in 1994, 
international Muslim organizations invested in the construction of madrasas propagating a 
Salafi ideology and the dissemination of Islamic literature with a Salafi message in the 
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country. Groups of self-proclaimed Salafis capitalized on this development by embracing 
Salafiyya officially as a new form of religiosity and establishing Salafi organizations in the 
Gambia in the late 1990s.   
Among the best-known of the Salafi organizations in Gambian society is the Islamic 
study group founded by Sheikh Abdullah, a Ghanaian scholar who established himself in 
the Gambian capital of Banjul in early 2000 with the aim of introducing Gambians to ‘real 
Islam’. In an interview Abdullah told me that he decided to settle in the Gambia because of 
Gambians’ ‘ignorance’ of Islam:  
 
For a long time, proper Islam was unknown in the Gambia. My aim was 
introducing Gambians to authentic Islam … We should lift the ignorance from our 
heads by engaging in religious study; ignorance is very heavy. Knowledge, on the 
other hand, is blessed. 
 
The scholar soon assembled a group of young students around him and Abdualye later also 
joined his study group.  
A striking feature of the Tablighi Jama‘at and Salafiyya in the Gambia is that they 
both hold special attraction for lower-middle-class youth between the ages of roughly 15 
and 35.9 It seems that these youngsters have adopted the movements to carve out a space 
for themselves in Gambian society in the absence of alternative means of reaching 
adulthood and a fulfilling life. The Gambian economy has gone into a downward spiral 
since the 1990s. The rate of unemployment has risen and inflation has increased the cost of 
living sharply. The situation deteriorated further when the government could not meet the 
conditions of accountability and transparency that were the prerequisites for a bail out by 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Darboe, 2007: 156). Educated youth 
in particular are hit hard by the Gambian crisis. A university student explained the 
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discontent of many Gambian youths with their situation in this way: ‘A university degree is 
the highest degree one can get, but we don’t have trust in it. We engage in proselytization, 
in order to reclaim our lost identity. We derive comfort from our religion.’  
Although prevailing analytical perspectives often take African youth’s marginalized 
position for granted, Gambian youngsters’ turn to religion cannot be reduced solely to 
worsening socio-economic conditions. The Jamaʻat and Salafiyya also appeal to them 
because they serve as what Weiss (2008: 199) calls a ‘moral compass’: they give direction 
to the life of disenfranchised youngsters by providing them with new religious coordinates 
on what it means to be Muslim and emotional and institutional support outside long-
established village and family structures.10 By offering Muslims alternatives to traditional 
models of identity, personhood and belonging, reformist movements have actively shaped 
the religious landscape in the Gambia over the last decade. 
Because they have grown into youth movements in Gambian society, a certain 
turnover seems to be ingrained in the Tablighi Jama‘at and Salafiyya. The stage in which 
many Gambian youth find themselves may be described, borrowing a term employed by 
Hamid (2009: 396), as ‘burnout’. Documenting the development of British Salafiyya, 
Hamid uses the term to denote a loss of faith among different Salafi groups resulting from 
their analyses of socio-political problems in the Muslim world and failure to find a solution 
to these problems. We may argue that as a result of their religious burnout, caused by 
social and professional obligations or a growing disinterest or disappointment with their 
religion, some Tablighis suffer a decline in their religious practice and withdraw to a 
worldly lifestyle (see also Soares and Osella, 2009: 11). Others, like Abdulaye, become 
tired of what they see as the Jama‘at’s lack of scholastic credentials and intend to return to 
Islam practised in what they consider its authentic form by reverting to Salafiyya. This 
pattern of backsliding and reversion is common throughout the Muslim world but is often 
not recognized because of the blind spot within the anthropology of Islam concerning the 
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complex and often contradictory way ethical practice works in everyday life (Schielke, 
2009b: 164).  
Although official records are unavailable, it seems Tablighis outnumber their Salafi 
peers in the Gambia. Nevertheless, there is a trend perceptible among inquisitive youth to 
withdraw from the Jama‘at. It remains to be seen whether Salafiyya, opening the prospect 
of expanding its adherents’ religious knowledge and offering scholarships to study in the 
Arab Muslim world, will eventually be more successful in attracting youth than the 
Jama‘at. Abdulaye is one of the youngsters drawn by the Salafi promise of further 
enlightenment. In what follows, I chart his conversion narrative which he described as a 
‘spritual journey’ leading him towards becoming ‘born again’.11   
 
Abdulaye’s spiritual journey 
My friend Kadi, a student from the University of the Gambia, introduced me to her former 
classmate Abdulaye, who had tried, vainly, to persuade her to veil. I met Abdulaye in his 
mother’s NGO, dedicated to improving the position of women in the Gambia. While 
showing me around, he apologized for the ‘awkward’ suit he was wearing. He explained 
that following the Prophet’s example, Muslims should wear a kaftan, trousers cut to ankle 
length and a prayer cap, but since he had been invited for a job interview he had to dress 
‘Western-style’. After his graduation in French Literature and Development Studies, 
Abdulaye had worked as a project coordinator in his mother’s NGO, but now that he had 
married a second wife he needed a well-paid job to be able to support his family. Although 
there was much at stake for him, he said he was not nervous about the interview because 
God was with him. 
After combing his beard, Abdulaye offered me a lift. He drove his car―given to him 
by his twin brother, who had migrated to the United States―rather fast. And at the same 
speed he told me about his life as a Muslim: 
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My schooldays I spent in Senegal, where my father was employed. I enjoyed 
learning French at school, but didn’t enjoy living in Senegal because many 
Senegalese aren’t proper Muslims. They worship Sufi saints, which is wrong. 
When I grew up, we moved back to the Gambia where I became more interested 
in Islam. I tried to live in accordance with Islamic principles by changing my 
dress code and stopping to listen to popular music. My family did not understand 
my transformation. Sometimes my mom tells me to shave my beard and wear 
Western-style clothes because she’s afraid that I will never find a good job. I 
don’t listen to her. I encourage her to veil, but she complains that it’s too hot in 
the Gambia. However, hellfire is hotter than wearing the veil!  
 
When we met later that week, it turned out that Abdulaye’s job application had not 
been successful because he was unwilling to shave his beard. He told me that he did not 
want to compromise his appearance for a ‘worldly occupation’, and he considered the fact 
that he had lost an earlier job because of his beard a ‘test by Allah’. One of the reasons 
why Abdulaye let his beard grow was that his wives found him attractive with it:    
 
Like I ask my wives to beautify themselves for me, I groom myself for them. 
While many of my peers are still unmarried, I already have two wives. People told 
me that I was too young to marry a second wife, but if one’s able to support one’s 
family, by the grace of Allah one should marry more than one wife. One shouldn’t 
postpone marriage; marriage is a form of worship. Marrying a second wife is 
better than playing around. I have had girlfriends before I married. I used to be a 
French teacher and I was very popular among my female students but, 
alhamdullilahi (praise be to God), I have become serious. When my female 
students started writing me love letters, I quit my job.  
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After reciting Quranic verses, Abdulaye―seated on a prayer mat on the floor 
(following the Prophet’s example, he preferred sitting on the floor to sitting in a 
chair)―spoke at length about what he called his ‘spiritual journey’: 
 
Since I was a kid, I asked myself what my purpose on earth was. My search for an 
answer to this question brought me to the Jama‘at in 2001. At that time I was a 
student. One of my friends decided to go on a missionary tour and I followed his 
example. After the tour, my life changed completely. I finally became a practising 
Muslim. Before, I lacked an agenda in my life; I used to have bad habits. I spent 
my time hanging around on the street, listening to music, going to nightclubs and 
being useless. The Jama‘at calmed down my ego and hot-headedness … It was as 
if I were born again.  
 
Despite his initial zeal, after some years Abdulaye switched allegiance to Salafiyya: 
 
When time went on, I realized that there was a lot of nonsense in the Jama‘at. Its 
intentions―Allah knows best―are good, but its method is very wrong. Islam is 
like an ocean and nobody can drink it in one day. Tablighis, however, believe that 
setting out on missionary tours is more important than gaining knowledge of 
Islam.  
 
According to Abdulaye, his ‘appetite for Islamic knowledge’ made him ‘quit’ the Jama‘at 
in 2004:  
 
Since I was eager to learn more about Islam, I was bored to death by the Jama‘at’s 
method. … I skyped with Arab scholars and they told me which books I had to 
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read. The things I read, I tried to implement in my life. I strive hard to lead a halal 
(Islamically lawful) life. My philosophy is to live Islam the way it’s supposed to 
be and to search for religious knowledge. During my search for true Islam, I met 
many Muslims calling themselves Salafis. I also attend a Salafi study group led by 
Sheikh Abdullah, during which we read and discuss the Islamic scriptures.   
 
Despite his aim of ‘returning’ to the time of the Prophet, Abdulaye resorted to modern 
communication technologies, like tape-recorded sermons, Salafi internet sites and email 
and Skype exchange with Salafi scholars, in his search for knowledge. In Abdulaye’s 
opinion Salafis are more advanced than Tablighis, whom he considers ‘backward’ in both 
their knowledge and practice:  
 
Like you are a researcher, I have researched Islam. The books written by 
Tablighis are full of falsehoods … I sought advice via email from several Islamic 
scholars. They told me that it’s better to read the Quran than setting out on 
missionary tours … Because the Prophet didn’t set out on such tours, it’s bid‘a 
(unlawful innovation) … What was done by the Salaf should be done by us as 
well.  
 
Having spoken at length about his life as a Muslim, Abdulaye announced that he was 
in the mood to play basketball, his favourite leisure activity. Although many Salafis 
believe that sports and Islam do not go together, Abdulaye called himself a ‘religious 
sportsman’ and claimed that sports is part of the Sunna: ‘The Prophet himself was involved 
in sports, like horse riding and archery. It’s not bad for a Muslim to do sports as long as he 
covers his knees.’ Besides playing basketball, Abdulaye was engaged in weightlifting, 
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which he stopped when he became too muscular: ‘It’s not good for Muslims to show off. 
Muslims should display modesty in their behaviour as well as their appearance.’  
Over the years, I stayed in touch with Abdulaye. Via email he updated me about his 
family and his career (after my departure he finally found a job as a bank employee) and 
requested me for support. He once wrote to me that he was ‘in dire need of Islamic 
literature and perfume, preferably from Armani, Hugo Boss, or any other designer’. In 
2009 he informed me that he had received a scholarship to participate in a two-year 
Master’s Degree Programme in French Studies at a French university. Unlike many of his 
peers, Abdulaye did not want to move to France, but preferred to participate in the 
programme via a correspondence course:  
 
Muslims have a bad reputation in the West and therefore I prefer to stay here, to 
the dissatisfaction of my twin brother who migrated to the USA and who wants 
me to migrate to the USA as well. Instead of traveling to the West, I prefer 
travelling, when I’m older, to Saudi Arabia in order to make the pilgrimage ... 
Although I study French literature, I make sure that I also study the Islamic 
scriptures. By studying French I invest in my life on this earth, but by studying the 
Quran I invest in my afterlife, which is much more important. May Allah reward 
us―Ameen. 
 
Compromising between being young and being Muslim 
According to Jules-Rosette (1975: 135) conversion is ‘a powerful clash resulting from the 
shift from one realm of thought and action to another, a moment of specific shock’. 
Similarly, Whitehouse (1998) has presented conversion as a systematic transformation in 
cognitive systems. Moving away from the strong emphasis on ‘rationality’ in Horton’s 
conversion model (1971, 1975a, 1975b), Hefner (1993), on the other hand, demonstrates 
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that conversion is first an issue of ‘self-identification’, and secondary a restructuring of 
belief systems. Indeed, in Abdulaye’s case it is hard to pinpoint a ‘moment of specific 
shock’, which led into a shift in his religious beliefs. His conversion to the Tablighi 
Jamaʻat and his later reversion to Salafiyya did not involve a change in belief so much as a  
shift in religious awareness and in choice of method to bring about religious reform. The 
change in Abdulaye’s religious awareness occurred after setting out on a missionary tour. 
Contrary to Tablighis, Salafis value religious study over engaging in missionary tours. This 
difference in method can be elucidated by Lambek’s (1990) distinction between ‘personal’ 
and ‘textual’ authority. Whereas Tablighis believe in personal religious authority and face-
to-face interactions, Salafis depend more on textual authority, recognizing the Islamic 
scriptures as the exclusive and final sources of knowledge.  
Although Abdulaye’s religious beliefs remained fairly stable over the years, he 
described his conversion as a profound act of moral self-refashioning: ‘It was as if I were 
born again’. His spiritual rebirth involved a struggle to develop himself as a believer in a 
self-conscious manner, by living up to a new moral standard. In this context, religious 
awareness is more than a cognitive signifier; it suggests a new way of being in the world 
and, with that, the invocation of a new subjectivity. It could be argued that Abdulaye’s 
recommitment to Islam was a ‘technology of the self’―to use Foucault’s (1997) 
notion―in that he worked on himself ethically so as to transform himself into a morally 
appropriate person, not only in the eyes of others but first and foremost to his own 
satisfaction. Reformist Muslims’ emphasis on the subjectification of the self to a higher 
moral discipline suggests that it is not belief or doctrine per se that explains conversion, 
which may be motivated instead by the wish to constitute the self as a moral subject.  
Importantly, although Abdulaye’s narrative shows that conversion is an act that 
displays a certain level of agency, the born-again subject is not necessarily an autonomous 
subject who chooses for himself. Abdulaye’s moral self-transformation was not identified 
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by him as a product of the self; it was engineered by God. Despite the problems he 
encountered with his family, who condemned his conversion as an act to distinguish 
himself from the local community, in Abdulaye’s opinion he had no other choice but to 
convert, for he understood choice not as an expression of his own will but as something 
prescribed by God in order to become a good Muslim.   
Abdulaye’s new-found religiosity proved to be both an enlightening experience and a 
heavy responsibility, as expressed in the metaphor of the spiritual journey that he and 
many of his peers used to describe their conversion experiences (Janson, 2014: 131–133, 
141–148). The goal with which they embarked on this journey was to reach moral 
perfection, but along the way they encountered challenges in the form taken by a ‘good 
life’ as it rose in their imagination, including music, dating, sports and other forms of 
leisure. Precisely these activities that make life pleasant for Gambian youth are thought to 
divert the believer from God and to undermine moral discipline and are therefore the target 
of what are described by Bayat (2007: 434–435) as fundamentalists’ ‘anti-fun campaigns’.  
In his study of the Spanish colonization of the Tagalogs, the largest ethno-linguistic 
group in the Philippines, Rafael (1993: xvii–xix) points out that the Spanish words 
conquista (conquest), conversión (conversion) and traducción (translation) are 
semantically related. Conversión literally means the act of changing a thing into something 
else; in its more common usage it denotes the act of bringing someone over to a religion or 
a practice. Conversion, like conquest, can thus be a process of crossing over into the 
domain―territorial, emotional, religious, or cultural―of someone else and claiming it as 
one’s own. Conversión also has a more prosaic meaning: the substitution of a word or 
proposition for another of equal significance. In this sense, it connotes translation. Of 
particular interest for my argument is Rafael’s characterization of conversion as ‘to give in 
by giving up what one wants’ (1993: xvii). Although I am referring to a radically different 
ethnographic and historical setting than Rafael,12 I find his approach useful in that the 
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moral self-transformation in which Muslim youth like Abdulaye are involved could be 
seen as a way of ‘conquering’ their youthful desires―described in terms of their nafs―and 
‘translating’ them into the ideals of a pious lifestyle. From the narratives that I recorded 
during my field research it appeared that nafs stands for the mundane issues that tend to 
derail young people’s efforts to achieve a moral lifestyle. Several interlocutors described 
their conversion in terms of a jihad, not in the sense of religious warfare but an internal 
battle against their nafs that impede the cultivation of morality. Like the metaphor of the 
spiritual journey, the description of conversion in terms of an auto-jihad illustrates the 
great difficulties experienced by Gambian Muslim youth in their quest for a moral lifestyle.  
To negotiate between morality and the good life, Abdulaye engaged in moral 
compromising. He stopped listening to popular music because he believed this was 
‘Satanic’. Instead, he started listening to tape-recorded sermons by Salafi scholars. 
Furthermore, he replaced watching Nigerian Nollywood films with watching Islamic 
DVDs on the life of the Prophet. In an attempt to lead a moral life, he also stopped 
weightlifting when his body became too muscular and thus ‘too showy’. Instead of fitness 
training, he now plays basketball, which he believes does not contradict his moral lifestyle 
as long as he covers his body properly.13 That he stopped weightlifting does not mean that 
Abdulaye no longer cared about his body; he claimed that it is important for a Muslim man 
to groom himself for his wives. Although his wives found him attractive with a beard, he 
was, to some extent, willing to compromise on his apparel when he was invited for a job 
interview―though his willingness to trim his beard and wear a Western-style suit was not 
enough for his employer, who preferred a clean-shaven employee.  
Abdulaye not only compromised on his appearance but also on his ethical principles. 
Although he had told me that he was unwilling to work for a bank because he considered 
interest haram (Islamically unlawful), he eventually accepted a job as a bank employee to 
be able to support his wives financially. Irrespective of the fact that his relatives and 
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friends told him that he was too young to engage in a polygamous marriage, he decided to 
marry a second wife in an effort to ‘discipline’ himself―acknowledging that women are 
his ‘weak point’. Another weak point was his pursuit of ‘luxury’―he liked fast cars, the 
latest models of mobile phones and designer perfumes. Although he was aware that his 
desire for Western consumption goods collided with Salafiyya’s frugal values, he 
legitimized his new mobile phone by arguing that he needed to make phone calls to Islamic 
scholars in Saudi Arabia. To embed his high-tech phone in his conception of morality, he 
changed the ringtone to Quranic recitation.  
To achieve the good life he was dreaming of, it was important for Abdulaye to 
continue his education. To his great joy he received a scholarship from a French university, 
but he did not want to move because he was afraid that living in the Western world would 
lead him astray from religion. He tried to compromise his interest in a secular subject, 
French literature, by engaging in religious study. In his struggle with his desire for 
Western-style schooling and Western consumption goods, Abdulaye resembles the 
Tanzanian Pentecostal youth described by Stambach (2000). Although in accord with the 
Pentecostal discourse in Tanzania these youths reject Western culture, in practice they are 
drawn into Western consumerism because of the cultural capital associated with 
membership of Pentecostal churches. Aware of the contradiction between their religious 
ideology and their consumption patterns, they argue that as youth they can be ‘forever born 
again … and again and again’ (Stambach, 2000: 178). Like the Tanzanian Pentecostal 
youth, Abdulaye legitimized his at times ‘un-Islamic’ conduct and preferences by 
underlining that he was ‘still young’ and involved in a learning process: ‘I’m only a 
student of Islam’. Moreover, he distinguished inventively between ‘small’ and ‘big sins’. 
Although realizing that several of his pursuits were in contradiction with his ideal of a 
moral lifestyle, he glossed over them by saying that they were not major moral 
transgressions but just ‘small sins’. After his graduation from the University of the Gambia 
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with high marks, Abdulaye was granted a ticket to Mecca by President Jammeh. Although 
he longed to make the pilgrimage he was also somewhat hesitant, since he knew he would 
have to adapt his lifestyle afterwards. Some of his mundane pursuits, which he now termed 
‘small sins’, would be considered ‘big sins’ after his pilgrimage.  
In a country where around 60 per cent of the population is below 24 years, Tablighi 
and Salafi youth are surely not the only Gambian actors who relate their youthful pursuits 
to Islam. Moreover, although approximately 95 per cent of the population is Muslim, Islam 
is not the only way to lead a moral life in Gambian society. Different groups of youth 
deploy different strategies in compromising between being young and being Muslim and 
these strategies are not necessarily of a pious or even religious nature (see also Masquelier, 
2007). For example, during Ramadan many of Abdulaye’s peers present themselves as 
pious Muslims, while in other contexts they engage in pursuits like smoking or drinking 
alcohol that contradict religion. Along with their Muslim identity, they have reinvented 
notions of youthfulness, since their leisure activities collide with conventional 
understandings of ‘proper’ youthful behaviour in Gambian society. Abandoning the 
traditional cultural groups based on age-set (kafoos), many urban Gambian youth 
nowadays prefer to socialize in ‘ghettos’, or urban street hang-outs where young, often 
unemployed, men socialise as a way of killing time. The ghetto signals a significant social 
and generational change and is a particularly poignant sign of the recent era of neo-liberal 
reforms (see also Soares, 2010: 245).14  
An example of a ‘ghetto boy’ is Abdulaye’s former friend Ahmed,15 who because of 
his school performance received a scholarship to study in Sudan. The outbreak of the civil 
war prevented him from travelling to Sudan and he then had to search for another 
challenge in his life, which he eventually found in the Tablighi Jama‘at. Under pressure of 
his family, who condemned his membership of the Jamaʻat as a form of Muslim 
‘extremism’, Ahmed eventually withdrew and joined a ghetto where he met with his 
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unemployed peers on a daily basis to drink tea, dream about a future life in ‘Babylon’ (a 
term derived from reggae music, referring to the West) and in the meantime wait for things 
to happen: ‘We spend our time in the ghetto because we don’t have much else to do. Life 
here is quite boring you know.’ For dispossessed urban youth like Ahmed Islam has only 
limited significance as a framework for self-representation.  
What reformist Muslim youth like Abdulaye and the so-called ghetto boys like 
Ahmed have in common is that they share a similar social profile: they represent the lower-
middle-class, have usually engaged in secular Western-style schooling and live in the city. 
Furthermore, both groups associate the ‘good life’ with a modern lifestyle, characterized 
by success (as represented by education, economic development in the form of a job and 
modern technology), as well as pleasure. Nevertheless, their interpretations of what 
‘modernity’ involves differ. For reformist Muslims like Abdulaye a modern lifestyle 
implies that they turn their back on long-established cultural traditions and the religious 
practices of their parents; instead of the local community and the extended family they 
affiliate themselves with the global community of Muslims, the umma. The ghetto boys, by 
contrast, associate a modern lifestyle with an escape from local cultural norms and family 
obligations through a migration to the West. Ghetto boys’ desire to leave the Gambia for 
‘Babylon’, that is, the Western world representing a place of unlimited possibilities and 
economic survival, is so strong that there is a special word for it in Gambian slang: ‘having 
nerves’. When my research assistant Sky consulted a doctor because of a stomach-ache, 
the first thing she asked him was whether he ‘had nerves’. This longing for a life in 
‘Babylon’ contrasts sharply with reformist Muslim youths’ aversion to the Western world. 
The latter do not associate modernity with the West, but rather with the East where, in their 
opinion, Islam originated. Remarkably, whereas Salafis regarded Saudi Arabia as the 
cradle of Islam, many Tablighis associated India and Pakistan with a purer understanding 
and practice of Islam, arguing that ‘for a long time the Meccans were idol-worshippers’. 
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For most ghetto boys a migration to ‘Babylon’ is not granted and they fill the gap between 
dreams and actual possibilities with buying or fantasizing about Western consumer goods. 
In a similar vein, Salafis and Tablighis appropriate goods and other tropes from a Saudi 
Arabian or South Asian context as a means to get closer to what they regard as the 
heartland of the Muslim umma, as well as a hub of wealth and technology beyond the 
Western world. Noor (2009) speaks here of a kind of ‘reversed Orientalism’. For Gambian 
reformist Muslim youth Saudi Arabia and South Asia have acquired a certain mythical 
status as a region where purity coalesces with prosperity. In a sense, then, it could be 
argued that they promote a typical Orientalist view about Saudi Arabia and South Asia: 
rather than the Orient representing an inferior Other, for Gambian reformist Muslims the 
Orient is a superior Other.  
 The above-mentioned illustrates that Muslim youthful identities are fragmented and 
fluid. Albeit often described as a shift from one religious belief to another, or a transition 
from impiety to a moral lifestyle, cases like that of Abdulaye and Ahmed illustrate that 
rather than a one-way journey, conversion as a spiritual journey or an auto-jihad is a 
bumpy passage with neither a definite direction nor a fixed final destination. Not only is 
conversion not a unilinear path; also the life course does not necessarily unfold according 
to a developmental teleology from youth to adulthood. Within the neo-liberal world order 
that restricts their chances and opportunities, youngsters have to find new ways to become 
moral persons and deploy their youthful identity as an asset to become somebody.  
 
Concluding remarks 
Based on extensive ethnographic field research among different varieties of Muslims in the 
Gambia, in this article I have challenged common understandings of conversion by 
questioning both the older anthropological literature that focuses on conversion between 
religions, especially between ‘local’ traditions and ‘world’ religions, and the emergent 
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anthropological literature on Muslim piety that looks at the practice of morality from the 
perspective of coherence. I have done so by recording the conversion narrative of 
Abdulaye, who embodies a trajectory of religiosity that is common among reformist 
Muslim youth in the Gambia. In an attempt to break with his past in order to create a new 
religious present in the hope of a better future, Abdulaye converted first to the Tablighi 
Jamaʻat and later reverted to Salafiyya. The case of his former friend Ahmed, who relapsed 
from the Jamaʻat to the ghetto, demonstrates that in Muslim youths’ search for a better 
future, the Jamaʻat not only competes with Salafiyya but also with a worldly lifestyle.  
Questioning the assumption that Islamic reform creates more standardized or 
uniform ways of practising Islam, the ethnography presented here illustrates that it 
encourages the creation of an ever-increasing multiplicity of religious expressions. The 
fluidity of Muslim subjectivities and the porosity of boundaries between these 
subjectivities demonstrate the inadequacy of conventional assumptions of conversion to 
capture the complexity of the different ways of being young and Muslim in everyday life 
(cf. Masquelier, 2007). Far from a one-way trajectory from one religious tradition to 
another or from a-religiosity to piety, Abdulaye’s conversion maps the continuous making 
of moral compromises and a preparedness to reflect on the ambiguity of selfhood, in which 
the making of these moral compromises inevitably results. This moral compromising is 
rooted in reformist Muslims’ wish to return to an ‘authentic’ Islam, while their desires 
centre upon a modern lifestyle characterized by progress and pleasure. Their resulting 
religiosity is as much a coming to terms with the modern world as a rejection of that 
world―the latter being the stereotypical image widely promulgated in Western media after 
the events of 9/11.        
In engaging with anthropological debates on conversion and morality, I have tried to 
contribute to the study of Islam by making a comparison with Pentecostalism. Although 
reformist Islam and Pentecostal Christianity are often portrayed as bounded and distinct 
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traditions, they mirror each other to a large extent in West Africa as appears particularly in 
their conception of conversion (Larkin and Meyer, 2006).16 Unlike many mainstream 
Muslims, who see it as their duty to convert other believers to Islam, reformist Muslims 
conceive of conversion in terms of a spiritual rebirth that lifts Muslims to a higher level of 
moral discipline. This reformist conception of conversion in terms of a spiritual rebirth is 
redolent of Pentecostal discourse.  
In her seminal article Make a Complete Break with the Past, Meyer (1998) illustrates 
that through conversion Pentecostals dissociate themselves from their past in the form of 
local cultural traditions and extended family life. Their rupture with the past coincides with 
new notions of the self and belonging. Interestingly, Meyer sees converts’ rupture with the 
past not merely as an aspect of Pentecostalism but as a feature of modernity itself, which 
brings together the conceptions of conversion as ‘rupture’ and ‘continuity’ that are central 
in the conversion debate. In order to break with the past and become born again, converts 
must engage in a dialectics of remembering and forgetting: ‘It is essential to realize that the 
alleged break “from the past” is only made possible through a practice of remembrance in 
the course of which this “past” is constructed’ (Meyer, 1998: 329). This notion of rupture 
with yet constant presence of the past is a paradigmatic feature of modern subjectivity 
(Meyer, 1998: 340; see also van der Veer, 1996). The analogy between the 
conceptualisation of conversion in terms of a break with the past and modernity’s self-
definition in terms of progress and continuous renewal explains why Pentecostal 
Christianity and reformist Islam resonate in so many different contexts.  
As Larkin and Meyer (2006: 287–288) illustrate, the mirroring of Pentecostalism in 
reformist Islam, and vice versa, occurs in three main ways. First, similar to Pentecostal 
Christians reformist Muslims enact their desire to remake religious practice by purging it 
from local traditions and extricating it from its cultural context. This is most obvious in the 
way they celebrate their life-cycle rituals. To the chagrin of their families, reformist 
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Muslim youth perform their rituals in a simple way without any aspect of entertainment or 
ostentatious gift-giving. For Abdulaye marriage, for example, is no longer a festive, social 
matter between two families; he sees it as an agreement between two individuals who are 
willing to enter into a ‘sacred contract’ with God. Remarkably, the reformist idea of 
marriage as a ‘divine institution’ seems closer to the sacramental, monogamist view of 
marriage that characterizes Christianity than to the contractual, polygamist view of 
mainstream Islam. Second, both Pentecostals and reformist Muslims offer new ways of 
becoming ‘modern’ through religious practice and in terms of access to economic 
networks, material goods, and lifestyles associated with modernity, which are pursued 
through transnational links. Reformist Muslims like Abdulaye see themselves as globalised 
individuals who no longer affiliate with their cultural roots, but relate instead to the Indian 
subcontinent and Saudi Arabia, considered regions where religiosity coalesces with 
prosperity. In the third mirror, related to the preceding two, Pentecostalism and reformist 
Islam represent new eras in the globalisation of religion, with intensified interaction―both 
religiously and economically―occurring between West Africa, North America and Europe 
on the one hand, and West Africa, the Middle East and South Asia on the other hand.  
By converting to reformist Islam, Abdulaye endeavoured to surpass the limits of 
locality and to dissociate himself from the ‘corrupt’ Western world by associating himself 
with the umma. Reformist Muslims’ new global subjectivity has social consequences. As 
appeared in Abdulaye’s narrative, his family did not understand his religious 
transformation and tried to push him to follow his twin brother’s example and migrate to 
the West. His new subjectivity thus alienated him from his family and the local 
community. This demonstrates that although conversion to reformist Islam is an act of 
moral self-refashioning, it has transformative power for Gambian society-at-large and for 
the Gambia’s implication in the modern world. Therefore, if the anthropology of 
Christianity and the anthropology of Islam have resided hitherto in distinct sub-disciplines, 
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the similarities in how Pentecostal Christians and reformist Muslims in West Africa 
articulate notions of personhood and belonging and interpretations of morality and 
modernity may call for a new conceptual framework that allows the anthropological study 
of Pentecostalism and reformist Islam within one field.  
Rather than abandoning the concept of conversion altogether―as suggested by the 
Comaroffs (1991: 249–251), who argue that because of its European, Christian connotation 
it has limited analytical value―we should explore its multivalence by showing that it is a 
quality of moral self-transformation as much as a tool for bringing outsiders into the group. 
Taking this course we may conclude that, confronted with the multiple ways of being 
Muslim and the ambiguities that the search for a moral lifestyle imply, there is a wide 
variety of possible answers to the question that occupies Abdulaye and his peers, ‘How, for 
God’s sake, can I be a good Muslim?’ The ambivalence, hope and tragedy implied in this 
question should be taken seriously, rather than wiped out by the current anthropological 
preoccupation with ethical perfection. What ethnographic fieldwork on conversion 
therefore needs is an eye for the ambiguities, uncertainties and contradictions as the 
constitutive moments in converts’ lived experiences (cf. Schielke, 2009b).     
 
Notes 
This article is based on ethnographic field research conducted in the Gambia between 2003 
and 2005, funded by the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World 
(ISIM) in Leiden, the Netherlands, and field research between 2006 and 2007, funded by 
the German Research Council (DFG) and conducted within the Zentrum Moderner Orient 
(ZMO) in Berlin, Germany. It has benefited from the helpful suggestions of many 
colleagues, in particular John Peel, Birgit Meyer, Adeline Masquelier, Benjamin Soares, 
Samuli Schielke, Paolo Gaibazzi, Daan Beekers and Just Boedeker. Parts of the article 
have been presented to audiences at the Anthropology Departmental Seminar of the 
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University of Sussex, Brighton, in 2010, and the Research Seminar on Anthropological 
Theory of the London School of Economics, London, in 2013. I am grateful to the people 
who offered comments on the paper in these different contexts and settings and to the 
anonymous reviewers of Ethnography for their helpful suggestions. My special 
appreciation goes to Sky Kanteh for his research assistance and the many Gambian youths 
who were willing to share their lives with me. All errors of fact are, of course, my own. 
 
 
1 Although I conducted interviews with young Muslim women as well, my focus here is on 
male youth, whose experiences of piety and leisure differ in many ways. For female 
youth’s religiosity in the Gambia, see Janson (2014).    
2 The Tablighi Jama‘at is a transnational Islamic missionary movement that originated in 
India and that propagates greater religious devotion and observance. Salafiyya, which is 
also known as Wahhabiyya in West Africa (though this term is often used by outsiders to 
describe the movement), strives to return to the Islam of the Salaf, the pious predecessors 
who lived at the time of the Prophet Muhammad, and subscribes to a literalist 
interpretation of Islam based on the core texts of Islamic belief: the Quran and hadith. 
3 Tuubi is used in both Wolof and Mandinka. It is derived from the Arabic tawba, the 
Quranic meaning of which is ‘repentance’ and by extension ‘conversion’ (see also Miran-
Guyon, 2012: 101). 
4 This appropriation is often referred to as ‘African Christianity’ (Gifford 1998). Somewhat 
paradoxically, whereas African Christianity is considered an entity in and of itself, the idea 
of an African Islam has been criticized severely because it formed the basis of French 
colonial policy with regard to Islam. However comforting the illusion of an ‘African Islam’ 
was for colonial administrators―who considered it to be more accommodating than ‘Arab 
Islam’―it had, as Launay (2006: 190) points out, negative consequences for the 
 32 
 
anthropological study of Islam in Africa. For a long time, anthropologists left the study of 
Islam to Orientalists, while themselves concentrating on decoding more ‘authentically’ 
African beliefs and practices.   
5 Although this article is structured around the conversion narrative of one individual, the 
other biographies that I recorded during my field research present similar accounts of 
conversion as an act of moral self-fashioning (Janson, 2014). Although conversion 
narratives may add to a better understanding of how religious ideology plays out in daily 
life, they are nearly absent in Islamic studies―unlike in studies of Christianity, where 
testimonies authenticate the convert’s newly-adopted religiosity (Peacock, 1984: 94; 
Stromberg, 1993). This difference may be explained by the fact that speaking out is 
considered a form of standing out, while Islam prescribes modesty and resignation as core 
virtues.      
6 The Tukulor originated in the Futa Toro region in Senegal and their desire to spread Islam 
led to migrations to the Gambia and other West African countries. 
7 Ahmadiyya is an Islamic missionary movement founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in 
India in the 19th century, which is often suppressed as heretical in the Muslim world. For a 
more detailed overview of the religious landscape in the Gambia, see Janson (2014: 52–
68). 
8 During my field research I also came across the opposite, but much rarer, phenomenon: 
Salafis turning into Tablighis. Although direct conversion into Salafiyya occurs, Salafi 
trajectories―and not only in the Gambia but worldwide―often lead through traces of the 
Tablighi Jama‘at (Adraoui, 2009). My interlocutors described the indirect conversion into 
Salafiyya as ‘reversion’.    
9 Although the study of religious reform usually focuses on activist Muslim youth (cf. Last, 
1992), the special appeal of religion to the young is not characteristic of Islam. For example, 
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van Dijk (1999) illustrates how Pentecostal youth use their faith to challenge gerontocratic 
power structures in Malawian society, and Maxwell (2002: 186) goes as far as claiming that 
Pentecostalism in Africa can be perceived as a ‘youth movement’.      
10 This new mode of belonging is not specific to the Tablighi Jama‘at and Salafiyya in the 
Gambia. Maxwell (2005: 6) points out that at the time of neo-liberal reform in Zimbabwe 
and beyond, Pentecostalism was able to provide those struggling for survival with a network 
of support and security.  
11 Although Abdulaye’s experiences are in many respects similar to his peers, in other 
respects they differed. Unlike many other Gambian youths who lack the means to attain the 
status of adulthood through education, employment, marriage and setting up their own 
households, Abdulaye had attended higher education, had married two wives and had been 
offered a scholarship to study in France.  
12 According to the Comaroffs (1991) and Asad (1993), conversion is so embedded in a 
colonial Christian context that it cannot be applied to other religions and other contexts. 
Since my interlocutors did employ conversion as a theological category, my point here is 
that conversion is applicable as an analytical category if we uncouple it from its particular 
religious and historical context and expand its use to comprise the attempt to break with 
the past with the aim of ‘returning’ to ‘correct’ religious practice.   
13 A dress code applies not only to Muslim women, but also to men, who are obliged to 
cover their body up to their knees and to cover their heads with a prayer cap or turban.  
14 The social phenomenon of young men passing the time in street hang-outs is widespread 
in Africa and beyond (e.g. Mains, 2007; Osella and Osella, 1998; Weiss, 2008; Soares, 
2010; Masquelier, 2013). 
15 Abdulaye terminated their friendship because of their conflicting opinions about how to 
lead a moral life. 
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16 This mirroring is less due to a direct influence of Pentecostalism on reformist Islam, 
since Pentecostals are of marginal significance in the Gambia, and more to independent 
adaption to similar circumstances. As Frederiks points out, the British colonial government 
was conservative in its policy of allowing new Christian churches in the Gambia, as a 
result of which Pentecostalism never became popular in the country (2003: 365–366). 
There are some Pentecostal churches that have been able to establish local branches in 
Gambian society. However, these churches have remained small and attract followers 
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